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EMI CA TALOGUE PARTNERSHIP AND EMI
ROBBINS CATALOG, INC. V. HILL,
HOLLIDA Y, CONNORS, COSMOPULOS INC.
AND SPALDING SPORTS WORLDWIDE
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761
INTRODUCTION
EMI Catalogue Partnership (hereinafter "EMI" or "Plaintiffs"),
the current holders of rights to the song entitled "Sing, Sing, Sing
(With a Swing), sought to prevent Spalding Sports Worldwide
(hereinafter "Spalding" or "Defendants"), from using an
alliterative version of the song's title backed by music similar to
"Sing, Sing, Sing" in a TV commercial for golf clubs.' Plaintiffs
brought a trademark suit seeking an injunction and damages for
unfair competition in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and
of state law.2 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of
defendants, and plaintiffs timely appeal followed.
The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment
for defendants stating that the district court improperly analyzed
the good faith requirement of fair use and erred in finding no
material issue of fact as to defendants' descriptive use of plaintiffs
mark in the title of the song.4
1 EMI Catalogue Partnership and EMI Robbins Catalog, Inc., v. Hill,
Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos and Spalding Sports Worldwide, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 30761 (2000).
2Id. at 1.
3 Id. at 1.
4 EMI, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS at 1.
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I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs own and administer all rights in the Benny Goodman
song "Sing, Sing, Sing (With a Swing) and in its title.5 EMI
contends that it owns the rights to license and advertise the song,
as well as other commercial uses, and the right to use and license
the title "Sing, Sing, Sing (With a Swing). EMI has earned in
excess of $4.7 million from its films and commercials during the
63 years it has used and licensed the right to the song.7
Defendant Spalding is a well-known manufacturer of golf clubs
and equipment. In 1997 it hired defendant advertising agency of
Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos (hereinafter "Hill Holliday")
to create a 30-second television commercial for a line of golf clubs
Spalding planned to market and sell under the trademark "Top-
Flite Tour Irons."8 The commercial's original model began with
images of three golfers hitting golf balls, followed by a black
screen displaying the phrase "Swing, Swing, Swing" in white
letters, which appeared for approximately one second.9 The music
playing in the background was a recording of "Sing, Sing, Sing."
The commercial continued with images of golfers, spectators and
golf clubs followed by different phrases such as "Top-Flite Tour
Irons," and "The #1 Iron on the Senior PGA," and "They'll Work
For You."
10
Spalding liked the outcome of the commercial, however, they
discovered that the cost of licensing "Sing, Sing, Sing" surpassed
its budget so it had Hill Holliday create a new commercial similar
to the original. The final version of the commercial used
essentially the same images as the first commercial and it licensed
stock music in a swing style for the background music.11 The
commercial begins with a close-up of the head of an iron in front
of a ball and an image of golf clubs in a golf bag, followed by the
5 Id. at 2.
6 Id. at 3
7 Id. at 3.
8 EMI, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, 3.
9 Id. at 4.
10 Id. at 4.
11Id. at 5.
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phrase "Swing, Swing, Swing" superimposed on the image. The
"Top-Flite Pro Irons" and related logos appear several times
throughout the commercial. 12 To obtain the stock swing music,
Hill Holliday asked a sound studio to search for a Benny Goodman
type song like "Swing, Swing, Swing," confusing the name of the
song in its request. 13 The studio came up with ter different songs
from which Hill Holliday selected the tune used in the final
commercial which prompted the instant litigation.
In 1998, plaintiff wrote defendant Hill Holliday alerting the
advertising agency that the combination of the music and the
phrase "Swing, Swing, Swing" in the commercial would confuse
consumers into associating the song and its title with Spalding's
golf clubs. 14  EMI demanded that defendant stop using the
commercial. Defendant refused to stop using the commercials
claiming that it used the phrase "Swing, Swing, Swing" to describe
the golfers shown swinging their clubs as well as explaining how it
licensed the stock music used in the commercial.15 Learning of the
defendant's refusal to pull the commercial, EMI filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Plaintiffs sought an injunction and damages for unfair
competition in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and of state
law. 6 EMI alleged that, "defendants' adoption and use of the title
and slogan "Swing, Swing, Swing" . . . conjoined with music
evocative of the well-known musical composition "Sing, Sing,
Sing (With a Swing)," constitute an unlawful use of that title and
slogan which is likely to cause mistake, confusion and/or
deception as to the sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of
Spalding's products and the marketing thereof with EMI."'
17
On February 17, 1999, defendants moved for summary
judgment. 18 The defendants conceded that EMII had a protectable
right under § 43(a) in the title to the song and that the title had
12 EMI, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, 5.
13 Id. at 5.
14 Id. at5.
15 Id. at6.
16 EMI, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, 6.
17 Id. at6.
18 Id. at 7.
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acquired a secondary meaning among consumers. 19 The District
Court did not reach the issue of likelihood of confusion; instead,
they ruled that defendants' use of "Swing, Swing, Swing"
constituted fair use.20 The court determined that the swinging
golfers in the commercial merely described an action that
Spalding's golfers will take using their product. The court found
the use "doubly descriptive" because the phrase also described the
type of music playing in the background and also found that the
display of Spalding's logo three times indicated the origin and
sponsorship of the product. As well, the district court rejected
EMIl's claim of bad faith on the part of defendants, claiming that
defendants acted in good faith by displaying its logo three times
during the commercial. 2'
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. DISCUSSION
1. EMI's claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits any person from
using in commerce, in connection with any goods, "any word,
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof...
which ... is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive.., as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods.., by another person."22 The central inquiry where there is
a claim of consumer confusion with regard to association of a
product with another person's mark is the "likelihood that an
appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to
19 Id. at 7.
20 EMI, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, 7.
21Id. at 8.
22 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
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be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods
in question.
' 23
EMI claimed that its mark in the song consists of the title "Sing,
Sing, Sing (With a Swing)" and in the music itself. The court
stated that EMI has no rights to the music as a trademark, but any
similarity between it and the stock music used in the commercial is
relevant to a fair use analysis. 24 The characteristics of a trademark
serve as indicators of the source of the goods and distinguish those
goods from other goods in commerce, as well as ensuring that a
product's manufacturer reaps the rewards of the reputation it has
built, and enabling consumers to recognize and repurchase goods
with which they have previously been satisfied with. A plaintiff
who claims unfair competition under § 43(a) must show that it
owns a valid trademark that is eligible for protection. 26 The court
concluded that EMI did not own a registered trademark in the song
or its title, but stated that unregistered trademarks are protected by
§ 43(a).27
EMI petitioned the court of appeals to recognize the musical
composition itself as a mark for itself that can be protected under §
43(a). "Because this would be tantamount to saying that a product
itself - in this case, the song - can serve as its own trademark," it
declined to do so. 28 The court's issue with the plaintiffs claim
was that it confused the distinctions between trademark protection
and copyright protection. The musical composition at issue in this
case cannot be a trademark in and of itself. "The title of a song
certainly may fulfill the source - or product - identifying function
of a mark. The musical composition, however, itself. is the
product. The score, or unique combinations of notes ... are the
essence of a song. Intellectual property law protects the owners'
rights in these unique combinations in distinct ways that lie outside
the realm of trademark law."2 9
23 Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1978).
24 EMI, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, 11.
25 Id. at 12.
26 Id. at 11.
27Id. at 11.
28 EMI, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, 14.
29Id. at 16.
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The court went on to state that "[c]opyright law, not trademark
law, is the primary vehicle for protecting the rights of a song's
composer or successor in interest in the musical composition."
Ownership of a copyright gives the owner exclusive rights to
reproduce the work in copies, prepare derivative works, and to
distribute copies of the copyrighted work.30  There are clearly
fundamental differences between trademark law and copyright law
and once an original work has been produced, trademark law is not
the proper means of protecting rights in this originality.31 The
court held that, "a musical composition cannot be protected as its
own trademark under the Lanham Act. Concluding that a song can
serve as an identifying mark of the song itself would stretch the
definition of trademark - and the protection afforded under § 43(a)
- too far and give trademark law a role in protecting the very
essence of the song, an unwarranted extension into an area already
protected by copyright law."
32
2. Fair Use Analysis
Even though the court held that the composition "Sing, Sing,
Sing (With a Swing)," was not protected as a trademark for itself
under §43(a), it did not end the court's analysis into the district
court's fair use analysis. Defendants conceded that EMIL had
trademark rights in the song title. To establish a fair use defense,
the defendants must have made use of EMI's mark "Sing, Sing,
Sing"; 1) other than as a mark; 2) in a descriptive sense; and, 3) in
good faith.33 The court stated that the "defendants did not use the
phrase "Swing, Swing, Swing" as a mark, but the parties
vigorously dispute whether the phrase unfairly used of plaintiffs'
mark or was merely descriptive of Spalding's product and used in
good faith."34
30 Id. at 16.
31 Id. at 17.
32 EMI, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, 18.
33 Id. at 19.
34 Id. at 19.
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The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition adopts as a
relevant factor in determining fair use as, "The physical nature of
the use in terms of size, location, and other characteristics in
comparison with the appearance of other descriptive matter or
other trademarks." 35 The Restatement also contends that the fair
use should be related to a degree in which the descriptive meaning
is relevant to the goods with which it is associated in the alleged
infringement, and whether there are other terms available to
describe the pertinent characteristic. 36 Where a mark incorporates
a term that is the only reasonably available means of describing a
characteristic of another's goods, the other's use of that term in a
descriptive sense will usually be protected by the fair use
doctrine.
37
The court stated, "whether a use is descriptive must be
determined by assessing the manner in which the mark is used
with respect to the product or service sold by the alleged infringer.
How the senior mark holder used the mark in conjunction with its
own product is not relevant to this inquiry." 38 Since the court
concluded that EMI's mark is limited to the song's title, it held that
the district court properly took into consideration whether "Swing,
Swing, Swing" as it appeared in the commercial was used as
descriptive of Spalding's products and of the genre of music
adopted as the soundtrack. The court further stated that the district
court was correct in refusing to take into account whether the
music used was imitative of the song in determining whether
defendants' use of "Swing, Swing, Swing" was descriptive.
39
The district court concluded that defendants used the phrase
"Swing, Swing, Swing" descriptively. The court of appeals,
however, concluded that "had the single word "Swing" appeared
in the commercial, it could not have been doubted that defendants'
use was descriptive. However, it was error to rule that the
alliterative phrase actually used was necessarily identical to the
35 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §28 cmt. c. (1995).
36 See Id.
37 New Kids on the Block v. News. Am. Pub'lg, Inc. 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.
1992).
38 EMI, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, 21.
39 Id. at 22.
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single descriptive word." While "Swing" is descriptive, "Swing,
Swing, Swing" is not necessarily so. 40 The court stated that it is
tenuous to assume that the action must be repeated three times to
describe three people hitting golf balls when the ordinary term for
their action involves the single word "swing," "hit," "stroke," or
"shot." 41 "The argument that the phrase as a whole describes the
genre of music in the soundtrack is patently incorrect, as it is
"swing" music, not "swing swing swing" music."42 The court
concluded that a material issue of fact remained as to whether the
use of "Swing, Swing, Swing" as related to the goods or action
displayed in the commercial was descriptive.43
3. Defendant's Good Faith
Another aspect of the fair use analysis requires a finding that the
defendants used the protected mark in good faith. Courts that have
considered this issue associate a lack of good faith with the
subsequent user's intent to trade on the good will of the trademark
holder by creating confusion as to the source of sponsorship.44
The relevant inquiry here is whether the defendant, in adopting its
mark, intended to capitalize on the plaintiff s good will.
In considering the likelihood of confusion and determining the
similarity between two marks, a court must take into account the
overall context in which the marks appear and the totality of
factors that may cause consumer confusion.45 The court stated that
since "the good faith inquiry in a fair use analysis necessarily
concerns the question whether the user of a mark intended to
create consumer confusion as to the source or sponsorship, we
think that the same contextual considerations apply to a court's
analysis of good faith in the fair use defense to a claim under §
40 Id. at 22.
41 Id. at 23.
42 EMI, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, 23.
43 Id. at 23.
44 Id. at 23.
45 Id. at 26.
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43(a)."46 Given the proper focus of the good faith determination,
the court concluded that the district court erred in its analysis by
failing to adequately consider whether the use of stock swing
music in conjunction with the phrase "Swing, Swing, Swing" was
probative of the defendants' good or bad faith.47
The court of appeals concluded that the district court improperly
made factual determinations about the defendnts' good faith. The
district court relied on two guidelines: 1) prior knowledge of
plaintiffs mark does not by itself constitute bad faith; and, 2) the
display of defendant's own name or trademark in conjunction with
the mark it allegedly infringes is evidence of good faith. 8 The
court of appeals felt that this approach was an error because it
tended to only show evidence of the defendants' good faith and
ignored facts that eluded to evidence of defendants' bad faith.49 In
this way, the district court "improperly tilted the balance in favor
of a finding of good faith instead of determining whether a
material issue of fact existed.,
50
There was clearly evidence of defendants' bad faith in
attempting to trade upon the good will of the Benny Goodman
song. EMI presented evidence showing that when the commercial
was originally created, it intended to pay for the rights to the song
"Sing, Sing, Sing (With a Swing) and only decided not to when it
discovered that licensing this song would far exceed their budget.
Upon finding that the cost was too high, Hill Holliday merely
substituted stock swing music but continued to use the alterative
phrase "Swing, Swing, Swing." The court concluded that the
availability of other descriptive terms and a decision not to use
those other terms is evidence that suggests bad faith on the part of
the defendants.
51
The court does state, however, that the district court was correct
in determining that defendants' display of its own logo in the TV
ad is evidence of defendants' good faith. However, in drawing the
46 EMI, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, 27.
47 Id. at 27.
48 Id. at 28.
49 Id. at 28.
50 EMI, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, 28.
51 Id. at 29.
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inferences in the light most favorable to EMI and taking in the best
light EMI's argument that the stock swing music adopted would
sound similar to the Benny Goodman song to an ordinary
consumer, the court held that there were sufficient facts upon
which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants
intended, in bad faith, to trade in on EMI's good will in the title of
the song used by the phrase "Swing, Swing, Swing" in the
commercial.
52
The court concluded that there was clearly evidence of
defendants' good faith as well as defendants' bad faith. This
evidence, the court states, should have been looked it in light most
favorable to EMI and should have prevented summary judgment in
favor of the defendants' based on their fair use defense.53 This
evidence was best left to be determined by a trier of fact and was
not proper to consider on a motion for summary judgment.54
ill. CONCLUSION
It was clear in this case the district court improperly analyzed
the good faith requirement of fair use and erred in finding that no
material issue of fact remained as to defendants' descriptive use of
EMI's mark in the title of the song. The court reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Amy Sinclair
52 Id. at 30.
53 Id. at 30.
54 EMI, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, 30.
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